NIGERIA: Christians face Repeated Persecution as Government Fails to Intervene

There is a continuing pattern of attacks on rural communities, people travelling on vulnerable roads, farmers, miners and community security personnel.

By Dr Solomon Ubasi I www.virtueonline.org I October 8, 2026

The ongoing persecution of Christians in northern Nigeria is taking various forms including reducing or limiting opportunities to education, attack on Christian communities, mass abduction of school children, targeted attack/kidnap of clergy for ransom, abduction, force conversion and marriage of Christian minors, girls/married women.

There is the issue of suppression of public expressions of Christians, the denial of Certificates of Occupancy to build Churches in Sharia states, treatment of Christians with contempt, hostility and suspicion and, in most extreme cases, forcing Christians to evacuate their ancestral land for Fulani herdsmen are also examples of persecution of Christians in Nigeria particularly in the north.

There is currently an ongoing case of 4 Christians who were abducted from Zalaki in Bassa LGA area of Plateau state and taken to Bauchi state and allegedly converted to Islam, including a married woman. The four victims are: Loveth, whose name was changed to Maryam; Vivian, whose name was changed to Fatima; Janet, whose name was changed to Fa’iza; and Antonia, whose name was changed to Zainab. Their case is currently being pursued. These women were taken away only for their families to receive letters from the Bauchi State Sharia’h Commission notifying them about their alleged conversion.

There is also the case of 17-year-old Faith Barnabas, who was abducted and converted to Islam. Even when a Court ordered that she should be released to her mother, the Sharia Commission has refused to obey the court order, and they have kept the girl in an orphanage and denied her mother access to her. There was the case of Jennifer, whom it took intense pressure before she was eventually rescued.

Developments in Plateau State over the past three months, from July through early October 2026 is deeply concerning. With seeming efforts, there has been a renewed pattern of attacks in several parts of the state, particularly in Riyom, Barkin Ladi, Mangu, and Bokkos, all in the northern senatorial zone. These communities bearing the significant proportion of the casualty area are predominantly Christian farming communities. Sometimes we equally experience attacks against herders and other communities out of frustration and attempts of inhabitants of these communities to protect themselves from their attackers in what they perceive out of failure of the government security outfits.

These security outfits themselves have become objects of attacks from the Fulani militia (considered by the local Christian communities as Islamic occupiers). Recent attacks in Riyom and Barkin Ladi were largely a reaction from the Fulani militia following the arrest of one of their kingpins. He was arrested by the DSS (Department of state services or state security services, SSS). As a result, the Fulani have launched a serious propaganda campaign to blackmail the current State Director of the Department of State Services and call for his redeployment. The arrest of some of the masterminds of the attacks by the DSS in recent weeks has, to some extent, reduced the spate of mass attacks.

Recent attacks over the past three months July 2026

The renewed wave of violence became particularly visible in early July. On 4–5 July, attacks were reported in Berom communities in Riyom and Barkin Ladi, including Ta-Hoss, Sabon Layi and Kwi. The Berom Youth Moulders Association reported six people killed and one woman critically injured. The association described the attacks as part of continuing violence affecting predominantly Christian communities in the area.

On 11–12 July, gunmen attacked Kum and Wereng-Camp communities in Riyom LGA, killing at least nine members of one family, including a two-month-old baby. The attack reportedly lasted for more than an hour, with the attackers entering homes and shooting residents.

On 14 July, another resident of Wereng-Rim in Riyom was reportedly killed. Community sources described the incident as another attack in an area that had experienced repeated violence.

There were also attacks and security incidents around Jos South and Barkin Ladi, including an attack on the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) at Kuru. Security forces reportedly repelled the attack and killed one of the attackers. The military subsequently reported that six suspected terrorists had been killed in security operations between 26 June and 2 July.

In July, there was violence around the Plateau/Kaduna border, including an attack on Naridon in Kauru, Kaduna State, a community close to Ganawuri in Riyom, which reportedly killed at least 30 people. The incident illustrates the wider regional insecurity affecting communities around the Plateau-Kaduna border.

August 2026

August witnessed one of the most serious concentrations of attacks. On 16 August, settlements around Jwak Maitumbi in Mangu LGA were attacked. Reports indicated that several residents were killed, approximately 45 shelters were destroyed, and crops were damaged.

The following day, 18 August, gunmen attacked Bin-Per/Bin Mper in Mangu LGA. Initial reports put the number killed at more than 20; the Plateau Police Command initially reported 18 casualties but subsequently acknowledged that the number appeared to have risen above 20.

Other reports put the eventual death toll at approximately 24–28, illustrating the difficulty of establishing a single definitive figure immediately after such attacks. The attack resulted in a mass burial and a peaceful protest by women from the community, who called for stronger government protection. The police subsequently announced the arrest of a suspected mastermind, while the Nigerian Army moved its tactical headquarters to Mangu and launched Operation Hard Nut in response to the killings.

On 28 August, another series of attacks was reported in communities including Fang in Riyom, Radura in Barkin Ladi and Chakfem in Mangu. A pastor, Hills Emmanuel, who had been abducted along the Barkin Ladi–Bokkos road, was later found dead. Other people were also reportedly killed in the coordinated attacks.

September 2026

September has arguably been the most disturbing month in this recent cycle. On 13 September, nine passengers travelling towards Jos were killed when gunmen opened fire on their vehicle at Dungus in Jos South LGA. Separate attacks in Mangu and Riyom brought the reported death toll from incidents that night to at least 13.

Between 19 and 20 September, another wave of attacks occurred in Barkin Ladi, Riyom and surrounding communities. At least nine people were reportedly killed, including five people travelling to Gana-Ropp and two people, including a pastor, who were attacked while travelling to church at Dorowa Babuje. Other deaths were reported at Baten Wereng in Riyom and Ratyidi in Fan District.

In response, the Plateau State Government imposed a 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew in Barkin Ladi, Bokkos and Mangu, together with restrictions on motorcycle use. However, the attacks continued despite the curfew.

On 22 September, a security team responding to a distress call along Gagshi Road between Barkin Ladi and Bokkos was ambushed. One security operative was killed, while three civilians were reportedly killed in a separate attack at Rakok/Kafi Abu.

On 23 September, community sources reported further killings and the destruction of more than 20 hectares of farmland. Two miners were reportedly killed at Kworos Gangare, while other attacks affected communities in Riyom and Barkin Ladi.

On 25 September, three local vigilantes, including a community youth leader, were killed in Kassa, Barkin Ladi, while conducting a night patrol. The killings led women and youths to protest and temporarily block the Jos–Barkin Ladi–Mangu highway, demanding greater protection.

On 28 September, gunmen attacked a mining site at Rakum in Barkin Ladi, killing three women and injuring another person. These September attacks demonstrate that the problem is not limited to isolated incidents.

There appears to be a continuing pattern of attacks on rural communities, people travelling on vulnerable roads, farmers, miners and community security personnel.

What is the broader context?

It is important to add that Christian communities have suffered disproportionately in several of the recent attacks, particularly in Riyom, Barkin Ladi, Mangu and Bokkos. Many of these communities are predominantly Christian farming communities, and the killing of church members, pastors, families, farmers, and other civilians understandably creates a strong perception of religious persecution.

However, there have also been a few reprisal attacks against Fulani pastoralists, their cattle and other communities out of frustration. This is important to acknowledge because the Plateau crisis has been perceived by some to involve overlapping issues of land, farming and grazing, ethnic identity, religious identity, displacement, criminality, revenge attacks and longstanding communal grievances. Religious identity is an important dimension. It is seen as the root of the whole problem given that the Fulani cattle owners are not indigenous to the area in context and are largely of the Islamic faith. It is also perceived by the local communities who are largely Christians that the Fulanis have the backing of the Federal Government which is seen by many to be Islamic hence protects the perpetrators of all these dastardly acts.

It is important to note that the destruction of farms and displacement of rural populations may be almost as consequential as the immediate loss of life. When farmers cannot safely return to their farms, the consequences include food insecurity, loss of income, displacement, and increased dependence on humanitarian assistance.

There is also a serious issue of confidence in security institutions. Communities repeatedly complain that security responses often come after attacks rather than preventing them. The fact that some attacks have occurred during curfew hours has reinforced these concerns.

What is being done?

There have nevertheless been significant responses from government, security agencies and civil society. The military moved its tactical headquarters to Mangu following the August killings and launched Operation Hard Nut. Police also arrested a person described as a suspected mastermind of the Bin-Per attack and continued investigations.

Following the September attacks, the Plateau Government imposed a curfew on Barkin Ladi, Bokkos and Mangu and directed security agencies to strengthen operations in the affected areas.

The government has also provided humanitarian assistance. In September, the federal and

state governments announced the disbursement of ₦1.5 billion to 1,579 households affected by attacks in Mangu, Bokkos, Barkin Ladi, Riyom and Bassa.

At the community level, traditional rulers, Christian leaders, youth organizations, women’s groups and civil-society organizations have continued to document incidents, engage security agencies, demand accountability and advocate for better protection.

There is also increasing recognition that military and police responses alone cannot resolve the crisis. Intelligence gathering, early-warning systems, rapid response, community engagement, justice and prosecution, rehabilitation of victims, reconciliation and addressing the underlying competition over land and livelihoods all need to form part of the response.

The situation in Plateau has not fundamentally improved over the past three months. If anything, July through September saw a worrying resurgence of attacks, culminating in particularly intense violence in August and September. The fact that attacks have continued into October suggests that the underlying security problem remains unresolved.

What is needed now is to move from reaction to prevention.

Communities need effective early-warning and early-response mechanisms. Security agencies need better intelligence and the capacity to respond before attacks occur. Perpetrators need to be identified and prosecuted regardless of their identity or affiliation. Victims need protection and assistance, and displaced communities need the conditions necessary for safe and dignified return. Many people are internally displaced and not much is done by the government to return them to their communities.

For the Christian persecution question specifically, I think it is pertinent to say that Christian communities in parts of Plateau have experienced repeated and serious attacks, including killings of entire families, attacks on people travelling to church, killings of pastors, and destruction of predominantly Christian communities. These incidents deserve sustained national and international attention.

Continued international attention can make a difference, particularly when it is combined with engagement with Nigerian institutions and local actors. The objective should not simply be to highlight the number of people killed, but to help strengthen protection, accountability, freedom of religion or belief, humanitarian support, and the local peace architecture necessary to prevent these attacks from recurring.

The need for increased attention to the ongoing persecution and more sustained pressure on the Nigerian government will help. As we approach the general elections, the need for close monitoring of the election process cannot be overemphasized.

There is also need for more attention towards the speedy debate and subsequent passage of the State Police Bill into law will go a long way in tackling the insecurity.

Conclusion

I will conclude by adding that things have gotten worse for Christian communities in Nigeria. Several times, stakeholders have been engaged on the way forward on the prevailing situation, yet the situation has not improved. Most people from the Christian community have lost hope there will be any change to the situation. There is also no trust in the system, any form of dialogue (even though happening at different levels) and the federal government. There is the feeling that the government has the power but lacks the will to put an end to the persecution and security situation. The whole issue has been politicized and many dimensions have been added to it to confuse many from the heart of the matter. The deep level of corruption in the country cannot be written out of the matter. We can only pray and ask God for respite.

Dr Solomon Ubasi is Lecturer at the Jos Evangelical Theological Seminary of the Evangelical Church of West Africa, Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria