But is it really so straightforward? The paper suggests a certain ambivalence about whether this should be done everywhere in the Anglican Communion, though the argument clearly states that the blessing of same-sex unions should not only be recognized universally in the Communion but celebrated everywhere. There is no room for any other view and the classical teaching about marriage is given short-shrift. The argument for equating the marriage of a man and a woman with same-sex partnerings is advanced on the strength of one thing, namely, "changing cultural circumstances" in one culture - the North American - which the argument requires to be accepted by all other cultures.

Such privileging of the North American culture can only inflame and add to the unease in the Communion. It runs counter to the more modest and principled attempts by the Primates' Communique to guide the Communion through the recognition of the need for an Anglican Covenant, the draft of which offers so much hope for a principled and theological way of dealing with matters of polity and practice in the Anglican Communion.

The primacy given to changing cultural circumstances is problematic with respect to the overall argument, apart from its tone of self-assured certainties. One is reminded of T.S. Eliot's "eyes assured of certain certainties ... impatient to assume the world" (Preludes). But the paper touches directly upon a number of areas that need to be thoughtfully and theologically examined. The paper should be seen as a contribution to the continuing debate and not, as presented, a foreclosing on the possibilities of discussion.

At worse, the paper has the unfortunate quality of dismissing as fools and bigots those who might think that there is a problem with same-sex and same-sex blessings. It is hard to know what kind of discourse there can be in the light of such certainties. How can there be any voice for those who think that so much of this is, at most, a case of not-proven, let alone have serious theological questions from a considerable range of perspectives?

At best, the paper is a philosophical contribution to a theological and pastoral matter. As a philosophical paper, however, it reflects a particular philosophical position that assumes the primacy of secular reason. But can it be argued that that is Hooker's view, for instance? For Hooker there is no reason that operates independent of the divine reason. The treatment of the Fathers and the Medievals is also cursory and incomplete. Like the St. Michael Report, for instance, there is no mention of the sanctified forms of Christian friendship in the Christian tradition, such as the Greek rite adelphopoiesis or the Latin (Catholic) rite Ordo ad fratres faciendum, both of which distinguish the forms of covenanted friendship from the covenant of Christian marriage and bear witness to the voice of tradition on this vexed question.

While rightly calling attention to the three principles of Scripture, Tradition and Reason, what is at issue is their inter-relation for Anglican theology. The image of the three-legged stool, often associated with Richard Hooker, does not appear anywhere in the Lawes. For Hooker there is a necessary hierarchy of relation between these three; they are not co-equal principles with respect to the determination of questions about faith and practice.

Privileging secular reason over the theological reason of a Hooker and over the principles of Scripture and Tradition leads to a settled conclusion which makes engagement difficult. Nonetheless, "Making the Case" deserves a more considered and respectful reply, both theologically and philosophically, because it brings out so clearly so many of the assumptions in our culture that challenge the fundamental doctrines of Christian orthodoxy and the forms of their expression.

A theological consideration should examine the account of the relation between Scripture, Tradition and Reason with respect to changing cultural circumstances. A philosophical consideration should examine whether this account of an independent secular reason is (a) the only one or (b) adequate to the emergence of secular reason itself. For instance, does every change in cultural circumstance mandate doctrinal development? And is secular reason always monochromatic in its cultural expressions?

In the present climate of the Anglican Church of Canada, the tone of certainty on this matter may well result in the General Synod voting for the blessing of same-sex unions as equivalent to marriage. But far from foreclosing on the debate, the reasons for "making the case" can only excite further dismay, disorder and division - not the least of which is the breaking of the Canterbury Connection. "Making the Case" is not the final statement but another example that reveals the tremendous confusion in the contemporary Anglican Communion about moral theology.

As to the breaking of the Canterbury Connection, not all clergy can abjure what they have vowed at their ordination and which remains as the defining document for the understanding of the essential catholicity of the Anglican Church of Canada, namely, the Solemn Declaration of 1893. And despite the unilateral actions of diocesan and national churches, not everyone thinks that the Anglican Churches are simply Episcopal sects, synodically governed. And, perhaps, like "Sigier" of Brabant "lecturing down in Straw Street, hammer[ing] home/ Invidious truths as logic taught him to" (Dante, Paradiso, Canto X) reasoned discourse will continue in the hopes of a greater spirit of reconciling love and reason.

---The Rev'd David Curry is rector of Christ Church in Windsor, Nova Scotia